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Abstract 
This paper employs a microeconometric framework to examine the labor supply responses 
and the welfare effects from replacing current tax systems in Italy, Norway and Sweden by a 
flat  tax on total income. The flat tax rates are determined so that the tax revenues are equal to 
the revenues as of 1992. The flat tax rates vary from 23 per cent in Italy, 25 per cent in 
Norway, to 29 per cent in Sweden. In all three countries the labor supply responses decline 
sharply with pre-reform disposable income. The results show that the efficiency costs of the 
current tax systems relative to a flat tax may be rather high in Norway and much lower, but 
positive, in Italy and Sweden. In all three countries "rich" households — defined by their pre-
tax-reform income — tend to benefit (in terms of welfare) more than "poor" households. In 
Italy and Sweden a majority will lose from a shift to a flat tax, while in Norway a majority is 
predicted to win.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years there have been a growing concern in many OECD-countries about the costs 
of redistribution. Tax reforms have been introduced with the purpose of enhancing economic 
efficiency. According to the conventional wisdom in economics to achieve this goal the 
income tax schedules thus have to be made less progressive. The reforms that have been 
introduced have been based on this wisdom to an extent that the marginal tax rates faced by 
top rate earners have dropped from 70-80 per cent to around 40-50 per cent, Blundell (1996). 
Hence, since the late 1980's the tax systems of most OECD-countries have been changed 
towards a proportional tax schedule. 
 Institutional changes that have taken place in Europe have added to the growing 
concern about the costs of progressive income tax schedules, which in the early 1980's also 
differed with respect to the degree of progressitivity across European borders. An important 
aspect to the institutional changes that took place in EU was the introduction of the socalled 
four liberties: Free mobility of goods, services, labor and capital. These four liberties have 
created a new climate of competition which makes it costly to maintain tax systems that differ 
substantially across nations within the European Economic Area. 
 Labor has normally been considered to be the least mobile factor, at least when 
judged on the basis of European data. The dismantling of country-specific barriers may 
increase the mobility in European labor markets. Cultural differences and language problems 
may, on the other hand, have a substantial negative effect on mobility. Yet, the removal of 
mobility costs and the fact that (some) high skilled workers and professionals are rather 
mobile may in the long run prevent European nations from allowing for significant 
differences in the taxation of labor income. Thus, tax system competition may arise as a result 
of EU's introduction of the four liberties. Since progressive tax systems normally tax the 
higher income of skilled workers and professionals more heavily than the lower income of the 
lesser skilled, tax system competition may strengthen the current trend away from highly 
progressive tax schedules. These current trends towards less progressive tax schedules and the 
tax discussions going on within EU is the motivation behind this paper. 
 To analyze the impact on household behavior and welfare of a sharp movement away 
from progressive tax schedules we have taken the extreme position of analyzing the possible 
outcome of replacing "current" tax systems by a flat tax. We have employed a labor supply 
model ⎯ estimated on data from three countries (Norway, Sweden and Italy) ⎯ to simulate 
labor supply responses of married couples from replacing the tax systems as of 1992 by a flat 
tax on total income. The focus on married couples is motivated by the fact that married 
females are considered to be more responsive to changes in tax rates than other individuals. 
The mean level and distribution of the labor supply responses depend on preferences, 
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demographic and educational structure, tax and benefit rules, and other institutional 
constraints. Although the estimates of some of the key parameteres are quite equal across the 
three countries, other parameters as well as tax systems and other aspects of the choice 
environment differ. From a methodological point of view it is of interest to study whether 
country-specific variations in preferences and budget constraints create significant differences 
in the labor supply responses when the households are exposed to similar changes in tax rules. 
 Key features of our modeling framework, that distinguishes it from more traditional 
labor supply modeling say, the Hausman approach, Hausman (1979, 1980, 1981, 1985) are: 
− flexible functional form of the utility function that allows for rather general labor supply 
functions, 
− exact representation of tax and transfer rules when estimating the model, 
− restrictions on offered hours available in the market, 
− joint decisions of married couples. 
 Like Dickens and Lundberg (1993) we assume offered hours to be drawn from a 
market distribution. In contrast to Dickens and Lundberg (1993) we do not introduce a fixed 
maximum of jobs available for each individual. Moreover, and as apposed to Dickens and 
Lundberg (1993), we allow each job to be characterized by more than one attribute say, a 
fixed quantity of hours, a wage rate and non-pecuniary attributes. The opportunity sets, 
describing the sets of jobs available for the individual, is allowed to vary across individuals. 
Individuals differ with respect to skills, education and age, and consequently the opportunity 
sets differ across individuals. To account for unobserved differences in preferences as well as 
in opportunity sets out labor supply model allow for random, preferences and random 
opportunity sets. 
 Heterogeneity, observed as well as unobserved, is an important aspect of our 
modeling framework. This is so not only when estimating the model but also when the model 
is used in policy experiments. Thus, labor supply elasticities as well as the impact on labor 
supply of changes in the tax schedules are derived from stochastic simulations. In reporting 
the results we also show how these results differ with respect to variations in observed 
household characteristics. According to Atkinson (1995) too few empirical welfare analyses 
take heterogeneity into account when policy experiments are analyzed and reported. 
 Since the purpose of this paper is to compare the outcomes of a tax experiment on a 
model estimated on data from three countries, we will not go into details with respect to the 
econometric model. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief, but self-contained, 
description of our policy evaluation methodology which is based on a particular framework of 
modeling labor supply, see Dagsvik (1994) and Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1998) for 
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further details. The empirical specifications of the model and the estimation results, based on 
Italian, Norwegian and Swedish tax return data for married couples, are given in Appendix 1. 
Section 3 reports the policy simulation results, and Section 4 summarizes our findings. 
2. Methodological framework  
Our policy evaluation methodology relies on a microeconometric labor supply model. Labor 
supply behavior is analysed as a discrete choice problem, where the choice-alternatives are 
"job-packages". These job-packages are characterized by specific attributes such as wage 
rates, hours of work and other non-pecuniary variables. In addition, this framework is able to 
take into account that there are quantity constraints in the market, in the sense that different 
types of jobs are not equally available to every agent. Agents differ by qualifications, and jobs 
differ with respect to qualifications required.  
 Labor supply models are helpful devices for examining individual welfare effects 
from tax reforms. Normally, the welfare effects are measured by various Hicks-compensating 
measures, see Auerbach (1985), Hausman (1981) and King (1987) for a discussion of 
alternative money metrics of welfare change, and Hammond (1990) for arguments in favor of 
using Equivalent Variation (EV). Loosely speaking, EV is measured as the amount of money 
that has to be added to/subtracted from the household's disposable income under the initial tax 
rules in order to make the household indifferent between the intial and the alternative tax 
system. Note that EV is measured at the household level. EV sums up the household's net 
welfare gain/loss associated with behavioral responses induced by tax reforms, say, increased 
consumption and reduced leisure.  
 An empirical micro-model — such as the one we apply here — is designed to account 
for observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity arises from the 
fact that as econometricians we are unable to observe all factors that affect individual tastes 
and opportunities. These unobservables are modeled as random variables, which imply that a 
money metric of welfare change, at the household level, such as EV, becomes a random 
variable; see King (1987) and Atkinson (1990). In other words, micro-econometric models 
allow for studying the distribution of EV. The mean of this distribution is the overall mean  of 
the welfare gain or loss which indeed can be interpreted as being derived from an utilitarian 
social welfare function. Note that most empirical analyses of tax reforms solely report the 
mean EV, see e.g. Hausman (1985), Hausman and Poterba (1987) and Blomquist (1983), 
despite the fact that  microeconometric models with heterogeneous agents are estimated. 
Heterogeneous preferences and opportunity sets are important not only for estimation, but 
also for welfare analysis. Our approach allows for an evaluation that identifies both losers and 
winners. 
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2.1. The Simulation Framework 
We will first give a brief outline of the microeconometric model. For expository reasons we 
focus on an one-person household. Next we will explain how the simulations have been 
performed. 
Each agent is assumed to face a set of non-market and market opportunities. These 
sets may vary across households. A market opportunity is characterized by hours h, a wage 
rate w and other characteristics beyond hours and wages, say commuting time and the 
working environment. We let j summarize these other characteristics. A non-market 
opportunity carries zero hours and zero wage rates, but also in this case there may be many 
different opportunities according to different leisure and home production activities. Let 
denote the utility for agent i of consumption C, hours h (or, equivalently, leisure, 
with a positive marginal utility of leisure) and other job-characteristics j. The argument j in 
the utility function accounts for the fact that the agent's preferences may vary across job 
characteristics beyond hours of work and the wage rate. 
( )U C h ji , ,
 The economic budget constraint is given by 
  (1) ( )C f wh I= , ,
where I is non-labor income and f is a function that transforms gross income into after-tax 
income. To this end we suppress the fact that the f-function should have a subscript i to 
indicate that tax deductions vary across households. The price index of the composite good 
(called consumption) is equal to one. When inserting the budget constraint into the utility 
function we get We will assume that ( )( )U f wh I h ji , , , .
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( j,w,hh,I,whfvj,h,I,whfU iii )ε=  (2) 
where  is a positive, deterministic function which is quasi-concave in , 
increasing in the first argument and decreasing in the second. The term εi(h, w, j) is a random 
taste-shifter that is supposed to capture the effect of unobservable attributes associated with 
opportunity j. Note that this term is viewed as random from the econometrician's point of 
view, while it is assumed known to the agent. Specifically εi(h, w, j) accounts for the fact that 
for a given agent, tastes may vary over opportunities, hours and wages, and for a given 
opportunity, tastes may vary across agents. Let denote the set of market 
opportunities with hours h and wage rate w that are feasible to agent i, whilst  is the 
set of non-market opportunities. The set Bi  contains opportunities with fixed hours and 
wages, and where the remaining  characteristics, captured by j, vary. Thus, 
( )v C h, ( )C h,
( )Bi 0 0,
(B h wi , )
  5
( )j B h w h wi∈ ≥, , ,0 0
(V hi ,
≥ .
)
)
Again, we may assume that the sets Bi are known to the agents, but 
unknown to the econometricians. Finally, define 
  (3) ( ) ( .j,h),I,wh(fUmaxI,w,hV i)w,h(Bji i∈=
For agent i,  is the utility of the most preferred opportunity among the 
feasible opportunities with hours h and wage rate w and can be considered as the conditional 
indirect utility function, given hours of work and the wage rate. 
)w
 From (2) and (3) we get 
 ( ) ( ) ( w,heI,w,hw,hV iii ψ=  (4) 
where 
 ( ) ( ) ( j,w,hmaxw,he iw,hBji i )ε∈=  (5) 
and 
 ( .h),I,wh(fv)I,w,h( ii = )ψ  (6) 
 Recall that hours and wage rates are fixed for each job so that when a job has been 
chosen, then hours and wage rate follow. The individual agent is assumed to choose the job 
from his/her opportunity set that maximizes utility. The corresponding hours and wage rate, 
, therefore follow from maximizing  ( ).I,w,hVi( )h w,
 In order to obtain an explicit expression for the structure of the choice probabilities of 
realized hours and wage rates we have to make further assumptions about the distribution of 
the random components in this model. When the the taste-shifters are i.i.d. with distribution 
 ( )P h w j y y yiε ( , , ) exp ,≤ = −



 >
1
0  (7) 
Dagsvik (1994) has demonstrated that the choice probabilities attain a multinomial logit form. 
To deal with the problem of unobserved opportunity sets we specify densities that reflect the 
distribution of the opportunities. The parameters of these densities may depend on observed 
characteristics.  
 Let ( )ϕ h w,
( )h w,
 be the probability that agent i shall choose a job with hours and wage rate 
. In Dagsvik (1994) it is then shown that 
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( )  
> >
+
=


=≡
0 0
0
0
00
x y
iiii
iii
iy,xii dxdy)y,x(g)I,y,x(g)I,,(
)w,h(gg)I,w,h(
)y,x(Vmax)I,w,h(VPI,w,h
ψψ
ψϕ (8) 
for .  h w> >0 0,
 The probability of not working equals  
  
> >
+
=
0 0
0
0
00
00
00
x y
iiii
ii
i
dxdy)y,x(g)y,x(g),(
g),(
),(
ψψ
ψϕ  (9) 
The density function  can be interpreted as the mean of the fraction of jobs with 
hours h and wage rate w that are available for the individual. This density function arises from 
the fact that in the opportunity sets there are unobservable (to the econometrician) attributes 
associated with jobs with hours h and wage rate w. Similarly,  is the mean of the fraction 
of opportunities that are feasible job-opportunities.  will be less than 1 if there is a 
rationing of jobs, i.e. unemployment. Thus, this labor supply model can be estimated in an 
environment where there is unemployment. Note that the opportunity density, gi(·,·) may 
depend on the production technology of the firms as well as of the wage setting policies of the 
firms and the unions. 
(g h wi , )
0ig
0ig
 The functional form of  (8) and (9) is particularly attractive. The labor supply density 
( )ϕ h w,  is expressed as a simple function of the structural term of the utility function, ( )ψ ⋅ ,  
and of , which is an aggregate representation of the set of feasible job opportunities. 
The extension of the model to deal with the joint decisions of husband and wife is analogous 
to the case of single person households. Then the household is assumed to have preferences 
over household consumption and leisure for the husband and wife. For further details about 
the microecometric model we refer to Aaberge et al. (1998). 
( )g g0 ⋅
The model has been estimated on Swedish (1981), Norwegian (1986) and Italian data 
(1987). In all three datasets the population is restricted to married couples. Households with 
an income from self-employment that exceeds 20 per cent of total gross income are excluded 
from the samples. For the included households, income from self-empolyment and capital-
income have been added to net household income and are treated as exogeneous. We have 
restricted the ages  of the husband and the wife to be between 20 and 68 years old. The 
sample sizes vary from 1640 in Sweden to 2960 in Italy. The Swedish data set does not allow 
us to estimate participation probabilities. However, the Swedish participation rates in 1981 
were very high, even for females, and we might have gained little from including 
participation/non-participation observations in estimating the model. Empirical specifications 
and estimation results are reported in Appendix 1. 
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 The estimated models are used to simulate the labor supply, incomes and tax revenue 
that follow from imposing the 1992 tax systems in all three countries. For Norway we have 
used the population characteristics of 1992 in the simulation experiment, whilst for the two 
other countries we have employed the characteristics used in estimating the model. For all 
three countries we have used all details of the tax system as of 1992 to simulate labor supply, 
incomes and tax revenue in 1992. Next, we have run the model to simulate the behavioral and 
welfare effects of replacing the 1992 system by a flat tax on total income. Note that these 
simulation experiments are stochastic because the choice opportunities and the preferences 
are random from the econometrician’s point of view. Furthermore, it should be emphasized 
that the results reported below depend on the population characteristics and consequently, 
these result may change when these characteristics change. 
The stochastic simulations are done in the following way. First, for each household 
we draw wage rates (male and female) from the wage distribution for the household. 
Throughout the experiments we keep this wage rates fixed. Second, for each household i we 
draw r points: ( ) ;r,...,,t;)t(),t(h),t(h iFiMi 21=ε  where the subscripts attached to hours 
indicate male and female. Offered hours that are feasible for each household are drawn from a 
uniform distribution with full-time and part-time peaks, while εi(t) are drawn from the 
distribution given in (7). The optimal pair of jobs for each married couple is then derived 
from maximizing the utility function, given in (2), with respect to t; that is the jobs that yield 
the highest utility for the household are chosen.  
Welfare gains and losses are measured by Equivalent Variation (EV). To describe the 
method of calculation it appears convenient to introduce the following notation. Let 
 ( ) ( )( )( )~ , max max , , ,
, ( , )
V EV f U EV f hw I h ji h w j B h w ii
≡ +
∈
.  (10) 
 Note that ( )~ ,V EV fi  is the indirect utility for agent i under tax regime f, when the 
agent is endowed with non-taxable non-labor income EV. 
 We define equivalent variations for the agent as the amount EV determined by 
 ( ) ( )~ , ~ ,V EV f V fi i0 0= 1  (11) 
 
where the subscript 0 denotes the initial (reference) tax regime, and subscript 1 the alternative 
tax regime. Since the utility function is random so is also EV. The parameters of the 
distribution of EV are assessed by means of stochastic simulations. 
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3. Results of simulations 
3.1 Labor Supply Elasticities 
For each country the labor supply elasticities are derived by predicting labor supply (by 
stochastic simulation) for each household (wife and husband) when the tax rates are increased 
by 1 per cent. Individual responses are averaged across households to yield aggregate labor 
supply elasticities. Note that the elasticities depend on preferences, demographic and 
educational structure, tax functions and other constraints prevailing in the years that the 
elasticities refer to. These years are the years of the datasets used in estimating the model; for 
Italy it is 1987, for Norway 1986 and for Sweden 1981. Aggregated uncompensated 
elasticities are reported in Tables 1-3. The ”estimates” of the elasticities are based on 10 sets 
of simulation. In Tables 1-3 we report the mean and standard deviations for each elasticity.  
 
Table 1. Uncompensated aggregate labor supply elasticities, Italy 1987* 
Type of elasticity Male elasticities Female elasticities 
 Own wage Cross wage Own wage Cross wage 
Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
 
0.046 
(0.001) 
 
-0.081 
(0.002) 
 
0.654 
(0.006) 
 
-0.357 
(0.008) 
Elasticity of the 
conditional 
expectation of 
hours supply 
 
 
0.007 
(0.001) 
 
 
-0.035 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.078 
(0.003) 
 
 
-0.136 
(0.002) 
Elasticity of the 
unconditional 
expectation of 
hours supply 
 
 
0.053 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.116 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.737 
(0.006) 
 
 
-0.489 
(0.008) 
*Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
  9
Table 2. Uncompensated aggregate labor supply elasticities, Norway 1986* 
Type of elasticity Male elasticities Female elasticities 
 Own wage Cross wage Own wage Cross wage 
Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
 
0.17 
(0.004) 
 
-0.03 
(0.004) 
 
0.37 
(0.009) 
 
-0.12 
(0.008) 
Elasticity of the 
conditional 
expectation of 
hours supply 
 
 
0.11 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.05 
(0.004) 
 
 
0.54 
(0.007) 
 
 
-0.12 
(0.008) 
Elasticity of the 
unconditional 
expectation of 
hours supply 
 
 
0.28 
(0.005) 
 
 
-0.08 
(0.005) 
 
 
0.91 
(0.11) 
 
 
-0.24 
(0.014) 
*Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Table 3. Uncompensated aggregate labor supply elasticities, Sweden 1981*  
Type of elasticity Male elasticities Female elasticities 
 Own wage Cross wage Own wage Cross wage 
Elasticity of the 
conditional 
expectation of 
hours supply 
 
 
-0.020 
(0.001) 
 
 
-0.021 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.070 
(0.006) 
 
 
-0.065 
(0.008) 
*Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Tables 1-3 indicate that in all three countries female labor supply is more responsive than 
male labor supply. Moreover, the cross wage elasticities are all negative and sizeable relative 
to the own wage elasticities. This latter result is important to keep in mind when 
microeconometric results- as those reported here – are compared with labor supply elasticity 
estimates based on aggregate time series. The latter often tend to be lower than 
microeconometric based estimates of the own wage elasticities. However, the results reported 
here suggest that the time series estimates based on aggregate data might be downward biased 
when considered as estimates of the own wage elasticities. Wage rates for males and females 
typically vary in a similar way over the business cycle. Although estimation based on 
aggregate time series data often are done separately for males and females, very few time 
series analysts account for the fact that most adults live together in marriage or cohabitation. 
Consequently, they estimate the impact on labor supply of a simultaneous change in male and 
female wage rates over time, and where the own-wage effects are not disentangled from the 
cross effects. Therefore, time series analysts tend to pick up the net effect defined as the own 
wage rate elasticity minus the cross wage elasticity. Also in our microeconometric model we 
get low net effects. For instance in the case of Italy we observe that the net effect on labor 
  10
supply, given participation, is numerically small and negative both for men and women. The 
last row of Table 1 gives the labor supply elasticities in the total population and we observe 
that the net effect of an overall wage increase across gender dampens the labor supply 
response quite drastically compared to the impact given by the own wage elasticies. From 
Tables 1-3 we observe that this pattern is the same across countries. 
 Despite the differences in the choice environments and to some minor extent the 
differences in preferences across the three countries, the labor supply elasticities are quite 
similar. The labor supply elasticities suggest that the working females in Italy and Sweden are 
less responsive than in Norway. Since the late 1960s the female participation rate in Sweden 
has been the highest in the world. Thus, for the last two-three decades the labor market 
attachments of Swedish women have been very much the same as for men in Sweden. In 
addition Sweden is a highly unionized country with strict regulations of working hours. From 
Table 3 we see that the labor supply elasticities both for Swedish men and women are 
numerically small. We note that the mean labor supply curve for Swedish men even tend to be 
backward bending. The weak labor supply responses, given participation, in Italy may be due 
to relative high rigidity of working hours. This rigidity implies – like in Sweden - a more 
stringent choice for Italian workers: Either a normal "9 to 5" working day or not working at 
all; for further details about rigidity of working hours in Italy, see Di Tommaso(1998) and 
Malerba (1995).   
The high rigidity of working hours in Italy and Sweden is well documented in OECD 
statistics. According to OECD (1997), the ratios of part time jobs to full time jobs in Sweden 
and Italy in 1996 were among the lowest in OECD-Europe (23.5 per cent and 20.9 per cent, 
respectively). By contrast, the part-time ratio in Norway was 46.5 per cent which was the 
second highest in OECD Europe. Thus, the Norwegian labor market is rather flexible by 
European standards4. These differences across countries in the rigidity of offered working 
hours are indeed reflected in the estimates of g0 reported in Appendix 1. Rigidity of working 
hours may explain why labor supply elasticities are low.  
 Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that the participation decision in Italy is more responsive 
to changes in the economic incentives to work than in Norway. Given the differences in 
rigidity of working hours alluded to above, this result may appear to be counterintuitive. 
However, because the participation rate among married females in Italy is rather low by 
Scandinavian standards, there is a larger potential for increased participation in Italy than in 
the Scandinavian countries. The lower the participation rate is, the higher is the percentage 
increase in participation when working incentives are improved.  
                                                     
4 As an example, in Statistics Norway, which employs around 800 people, mostly women, there are 
above 60 different contracts of working hours.   
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 In Tables 4-6 we illustrate the variation of the labor supply elasticities with household 
income. To our knowledge very few labor supply analysts report how labor supply elasticities 
vary with income. One reason why might be that often as in the Hausman model, a linear 
labor supply function is assumed. Hence, it is assumed a priori that labor supply elasticities 
increase with the wage rate and decrease with hours worked. 
 A striking similarity across the three countries is the decline of the labor supply 
elasticities with income. For the richest household the labor supply elasticities for both gender 
are close to zero, and they are even negative for males in Sweden and Italy but also for 
females in Sweden. Thus, for the poorest household the labor supply curve is upward sloping, 
while for the richest it tends to be backward bending.5  
 
Table 4. Income-dependent uncompensated aggregate elasticities, Italy 1987 
Male elasticities Female elasticities Type of elasticity Deciles in the 
disposable income
distribution 
Own wage Cross wage Own wage Cross wage 
10 percent poorest  0.053 -0.109 2.837 -1.089 
80 percent in the 
middle 
 
 0.051 
 
-0.086 
 
0.742 
 
-0.356 
Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
10 percent richest -0.010 -0.013 0.031 -0.122 
10 percent poorest  0.021 -0.017 0.467 -1.410 
80 percent in the 
middle 
 
 0.011 
 
-0.045 
 
0.100 
 
-0.150 
Elasticity of the 
conditional 
expectation of  
hours supply 10 percent richest -0.030 -0.015 0.004 -0.600 
10 percent poorest  0.075 -0.126 3.441 -1.454 
80 percent in the 
middle 
 
 0.062 
 
-0.130 
 
0.832 
 
-0.501 
Elasticity of the 
unconditional 
expectation of  
hours supply 10 percent richest -0.041 -0.029 0.035 -0.181 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 The compensated elasticities exhibit a similar variation with income; see Aaaberge et al 
(1990,1993,1995,1998). 
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Table 5. Income dependent aggregate labor supply elasticities, Norway 1986. 
Male elasticities Female elasticities Type of elasticity Deciles in the 
disposable income
distribution 
Own wage Cross wage Own wage Cross wage 
10 percent poorest 1.89 -1.04 1.85 -1.44 
80 percent in the 
middle 
 
0.09 
 
-0.08 
 
0.66 
 
-0.29 
Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
10 percent richest 0.03  0.00 0.07 -0.03 
10 percent poorest 0.29 -0.15 1.04 -1.04 
80 percent in the 
middle 
 
0.07 
 
-0.09 
 
0.78 
 
-0.29 
Elasticity of the 
conditional 
expectation of  
hours supply 10 percent richest 0.03 -0.01 0.12 -0.06 
10 percent poorest 2.23 -1.18 3.09 -2.23 
80 percent in the 
middle 
 
0.16 
 
-0.17 
 
1.49 
 
-0.57 
Elasticity of the 
unconditional 
expectation of  
hours supply 10 percent richest 0.06 -0.01 0.19 -0.08 
 
Table 6. Income-dependent aggregate uncompensated labor supply elasticities, Sweden 
1981. 
Male elasticities Female elasticities Type of elasticity Deciles in the 
disposable income
distribution 
Own wage Cross wage Own wage Cross wage 
10 percent poorest  0.054 -0.038 0.069 -0.031 
80 percent in the 
middle 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.019 
 
0.034 
 
-0.067 
Elasticity of the 
conditional 
expectation of  
hours supply 10 percent richest -0.047 -0.024 -0.037 -0.072 
 
3.2 Tax reform simulations 
The married couple version of the model outlined in Section 2 is employed to simulate labor 
supply responses and individual welfare effects from introducing a flat tax on income. The tax 
reform simulations are performed in a partial equilibrium setting, as in Browning (1987). In 
our framework, this means that the opportunity densities of offered wages and hours are 
considered as exogenously given and they are thus unaffected by a change of tax systems. 
Moreover, the total number of jobs are assumed to increase (decrease) with increasing 
(decreasing) labor supply. The results reported below may have been modified if our 
econometric model of labor supply had been embedded in a general equilibrium framework. 
For instance, an increase in labor supply due to a change of tax rules might have had a 
negative impact on wage rate levels and hence some second order effects on labor supply 
would have appeared. However, to extend our econometric model with heterogeneous agents 
to a general equilibrium model is not an easy task, and it is left for future work. 
 As mentioned above, for all three countries the estimated microeconometric models 
are applied to simulate labor supply, incomes and tax revenue in 1992. This year was chosen 
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because similar tax reforms were introduced  in Norway 1992, Sweden 1990 and in Italy 
gradually over  years in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The tax revenue is kept fixed at the 
1992 level when the model is used to assess the impacts of introducing a flat tax on income. 
 The results of Tables 7-9 show that the labor supply responses from replacing the 
1992-tax-regime ("current tax regime") by a proportional tax are rather strong in Norway, in 
particular for females. The labor supply responses decrease with increasing pre-reform 
household income, which is in line with the predictions of the income-dependent elasticities. 
It should also be noted that for Norway and Sweden a shift to a flat tax implies that the "poor" 
households experience reduced marginal tax rates and increased average tax rate. Thus, the 
substitution as well as the income effect predict higher labor supply. For the "rich" 
households both the marginal and the average tax rates decrease. Consequently, the 
substitution and income effects for "rich" households have different signs and thus have 
counteracting impacts on labor supply. In Italy the lowest marginal tax rate under the 1992 
tax regime is below the proportional tax rate calculated here.  
In the model employed in this paper not every working hour is equally likely to be 
available in the opportunity set. Opportunities with full-time working loads are more likely to 
be available in the choice sets. After a change to proportional taxation the market 
opportunities with long working hours carry lower marginal tax rates than under the 1992 
regime. Thus participation may become more attractive and hours worked makes a discrete 
jump from zero to rather long hours. Note that a traditonal – text book - labor supply model 
would not be able to capture this discret jump in labor supply.  
 As an implication of these labor supply responses gross as well as net income increase 
for almost all households in all three countries. The increase in income for the "poorest" 
households in Norway is rather strong and follows from the strong labor supply responses. 
Note that the total tax revenues are kept constant at the 1992 national levels. 
 Table 10 reports the Gini coefficients of gross and disposable household income. The 
results for Norway demonstrate that even inequality in the distribution of disposable income 
decreases substantially, which mainly is due to the strong labor supply responses among 
"poor" households. By contrast, for Sweden we find that the inequality in the distribution of 
disposable income increases. For Italy we find only minor changes in income inequality. 
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Table 7. Participation rates, annual hours of work, gross income, disposable income and 
taxes for married couples under alternative tax regimes by disposable household income 
in 1992. Italy 
    Annual hours of work Households, 1000 ITL 1992 
  Participation 
Rates 
per cent 
Given 
Participation 
In the total 
population 
Gross 
Income 
Taxes1) Dis- 
posable 
income 
  F M F M F M    
 
1992- 
tax rules 
I 
II 
III 
 4.3 
38.5 
70.0 
97.0 
96.3 
94.4 
1529 
1691 
1809 
1832 
2036 
2053 
  66 
 651 
1265 
1777 
1961 
1939 
 19756 
 44877 
 90452 
  3656 
 10845 
 21047 
 16100 
 34032 
 69405 
 IV 38.2 96.2 1711 2017  654 1940  46920  11146  35774 
 
Proportional 
taxes1) 
I 
II 
III 
 4.3 
36.5 
67.4 
97.5 
96.2 
94.6 
1398 
1712 
1819 
1855 
2058 
2091 
  62 
 625 
1225 
1809 
1981 
1979 
 20394 
 45717 
91544 
  4882 
 10931 
 19132 
 15512 
 34786 
 72411 
 IV 36.4 96.2 1729 2041  692 1963  47765  11146  36619 
1) The proportional tax rate of 23.3 per cent is determined by model simulation when the tax revenue 
is held fixed equal to the 1992 tax revenue. 
     Note that I = 10 per cent poorest households 
 II = 80 per cent in the middle of the income distribution 
 III = 10 per cent richest households 
 IV = all households 
 
Table 8. Participation rates, annual hours of work, gross income, disposable income and 
taxes for married couples under alternative tax regimes by disposable household income 
in 1992. Norway 
    Annual hours of work Households, NOK 1992 
  Participation 
Rates 
per cent 
Given 
Participation 
In the total 
population 
Gross 
Income 
Taxes1) Dis- 
posable 
income 
  F M F M F M    
 
1992- 
tax rules 
I 
II 
III 
41.5 
77.3 
96.4 
74.1 
98.4 
99.9 
 926 
1494 
2279 
1833 
2432 
2846 
 386 
1154 
2198 
1360 
2394 
2846 
160158 
372208 
650958 
 36454 
115816 
235295 
123705 
256392 
415662 
 IV 75.4 96.0 1562 2427 1178 2331 383495 119437 264058 
 
Proportional 
taxes1) 
I 
II 
III 
73.2 
80.6 
95.8 
96.2 
99.5 
99.9 
1756 
1761 
2311 
2660 
2743 
2906 
1286 
1419 
2213 
2557 
2729 
2902 
413326 
471282 
672104 
102137 
116107 
163658 
311189 
355175 
508446 
 IV 81.4 99.2 1825 2751 1485 2730 485481 119445 366036 
1) The proportional tax rate of 25.4 per cent is determined by model simulation when the tax revenue 
is held fixed equal to the 1992 tax revenue. 
     Note that I = 10 per cent poorest households 
 II = 80 per cent in the middle of the incomedistribution 
 III = 10 per cent richest households 
 IV = all households 
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Table  9. Annual hours of work, gross income, disposable income and taxes for married 
couples under alternative tax regimes. Sweden 
  Annual hours of work, 
Given participation 
Households, SEK 1992 
   
F 
 
M 
Gross 
income 
Taxes1) Disposable 
income 
 
1992- 
tax rules 
I 
II 
III 
1 147 
1 690 
1 847 
1 903 
2 117 
2 339 
221 966 
382 603 
706 351 
 55 757 
110 792 
245 257 
166 209 
271 811 
461 094 
 IV 1 656 2 126 401 227 119 838 281 389 
 
Proportional 
Taxes1) 
I 
II 
III 
1 188 
1 721 
1 874 
1 977 
2 209 
2 464 
232 468 
399 407 
741 690 
 67 835 
115 211 
208 837 
164 632 
284 195 
532 853 
 IV 1 683 2 211 416 952 119 839 297 113 
1) The proportional tax rate of 29.5 per cent is determined by model simulation when the tax revenue 
is held fixed equal to the 1992 tax revenue. 
 Note that I = 10 per cent poorest households 
 II = 80 per cent in the middle of the incomedistribution  
 III = 10 per cent richest households 
 IV = all households 
 
 
Table 10. Gini coefficients of distributions of gross and disposable income for couples in 
Italy, Norway and Sweden 
Tax system Nation Gross income Disposable 
income 
1992 tax rules Italy .243 .234 
 Norway .205 .177 
 Sweden .192 .164 
    
Proportional taxation Italy .238 .238 
 Norway .165 .165 
 Sweden .202 .202 
 
Tables 11-13 give information on the distribution of equivalent variation by household 
income. Due to the responsive female labor supply in Norway nearly all (99 per cent) win 
from replacing the 1992 tax system by a flat tax. Only a few poor households lose. In the first 
decile of the pre-reform income distribution 8.6 per cent is predicted to lose from having a flat 
tax rather than the progressive tax structure of 1992. In Italy and Sweden the proportions of 
losers are rather high, in fact, in these two countries a majority is predicted to lose from 
replacing the 1992 tax rules by a flat tax (59 and 56 per cent, respectively). In Norway and 
Sweden, and to some minor extent in Italy, the proportion of winners increases with rising 
pre-reform household income. Note that the only measure of welfare change one is allowed to 
report in an ordinalist framework is the fractions of losers and winners in the population. 
 However, if one allows for an interpersonal comparisons of utility differences based 
on a money measure of welfare say, EV, one can compare the magnitudes of EV given in 
Tables 11-13.  The mean EV in all three countries is positive which suggests that there are 
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efficiency costs related to the 1992 tax regimes compared to proportional taxation. Tables 11-
13 report the mean EV relative to the tax revenue and the results indicate that the costs of the 
1992  tax system relative to a flat tax vary from 1.5 per cent for Italy, 4.8 per cent for Sweden, 
to as much as 34.2 per cent for Norway.  
 King (1987) argues that a small mean welfare gain may shadow for a large variation 
in gains and losses across households. Thus, King stresses the importance of accounting for 
heterogeneity when making welfare assessments of tax reforms. Hammond (1990) puts 
forward the same warnings. Our results confirm the relevance of these warnings. Although 
only one per cent of the population lose from the considered tax reform in Norway, between 
56 and 59 per cent lose in Italy and Sweden. In Italy the mean welfare loss among the losers 
is ITL 1 029 000, while the mean gain among the winners is ITL 1 890 000. In Sweden the 
mean loss among the losers is SEK 8 252, while the mean gain among the winners is 
approximately three times higher.  
 
Table 11. Distribution of equivalent variation by household income1) under 1992-taxes. 
Italy 
Equivalent variations, 1000 ITL 1992 
Total Losers Winners 
 Mean 
 
EV 
relative to 
average tax 
Per cent 
Per cent 
of popu- 
lation 
Mean 
 
EV 
Relative to 
Average tax
Per cent 
Per cent 
of popu- 
lation 
Mean 
 
EV 
relative to 
average tax 
Per cent 
I 
II 
III 
165 
120 
517 
4.5 
1.1 
2.5 
58.5 
60.1 
51.8 
-1032 
-1030 
-1008 
-28.0 
 -9.6 
-4.8 
 41.5 
 39.9 
48.2 
1860 
1855 
2157 
51.8 
16.7 
10.3 
IV 164 1.5 59.1 -1029  -9.4  40.9 1890 16.5 
1) Note that I = 10 per cent poorest households 
 II =  80 per cent in the middle of the distribution of households' disposable income 
 III =  10 per cent richest households 
 IV =  all households 
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Table 12. Distribution of equivalent variation by household income1) under 1992-taxes. 
Norway  
Equivalent variations, NOK 1992 
Total Losers Winners 
 Mean 
 
EV 
relative to 
average tax 
Per cent 
Per cent 
of popu- 
lation 
Mean 
 
EV 
Relative to 
Average tax
Per cent 
Per cent 
of popu- 
lation 
Mean 
 
 
EV 
relative to 
average tax 
Per cent 
I 
II 
III 
21799 
38199 
80811 
59.8 
33.0 
34.3 
8.6 
0.3 
0.0 
-3694 
-1301 
- 
-11.8 
 -2.2 
- 
 91.4 
 99.7 
100.0 
24132 
38288 
80811 
65.1 
33.0 
34.3 
IV 40804 34.2 1.0 -3425  -9.9  99.0 41258 34.2 
1) Note that I = 10 per cent poorest households 
 II =  80 per cent in the middle of the distribution of households' disposable income 
 III =  10 per cent richest households 
 IV =  all households 
 
 
Table 13. Distribution of equivalent variation by household income1) under 1992-taxes. 
Sweden 
Equivalent variations, SEK 1992 
Total Losers Winners 
 Mean 
 
EV 
relative to 
average tax 
Per cent 
Per cent 
of popu- 
lation 
Mean 
 
EV 
Relative to 
Average tax
Per cent 
Per cent 
of popu- 
lation 
Mean 
 
 
EV 
relative to 
average tax 
Per cent 
I 
II 
III 
-8451 
 1960 
49962 
-15.2 
  1.8 
 20.4 
95.2 
58.4 
 3.6 
-9420 
 -8350 
-7642 
-17.5 
 -9.6 
 -7.2 
 4.8 
41.6 
96.4 
10503 
16433 
52139 
13.0 
11.3 
20.3 
IV  5722   4.8   56.6 -8525 -10.5  43.4 24291 14.3 
1) Note that I = 10 per cent poorest households 
 II =  80 per cent in the middle of the distribution of households' disposable income 
 III =  10 per cent richest households 
 IV =  all households 
 
4. Summary and discussion 
The current trend in tax reforms which has implied a sharp movement away from highly 
progressive taxes which may be further strengthened by a possible tax system competition 
(Sinn, 1997) may change the current progressive tax systems in Europe towards a 
proportional tax on income. This process may lead to proportional tax rates that differ across 
country to account for initial differences in tax revenues.  
The objective of this paper is to examine the welfare effects for married couples from 
replacing current tax systems by a proportional labor income tax. To broaden the relevance of 
our study we compare Norway and Sweden with Italy, which has a low degree of progression 
in the taxation of labor income by Scandinavian standards. Based on a microeconometric 
labor supply model estimated on data from the three countries , we have simulated labor 
supply responses and welfare gains and losses for married couples from replacing the 
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country-specific 1992-tax systems by proportional taxation. The flat tax rates are chosen so as 
to keep the tax revenues fixed and equal to the country-specific 1992-revenue. The simulation 
results show that the proportional tax rates vary from 23 (Italy), 25 (Norway) to 29 percent 
(Sweden) which are close to the current tax rates on capital income. The mean welfare effect 
from introducing proportional taxation is found to be positive which indicates that there are 
efficiency costs associated with the current progressive labor income taxes. However, the 
results reveal large variation in the distribution of welfare gains and losses. Rich households 
— defined by their pre-reform income — tend to benefit in welfare terms more than the poor. 
Moreover, the losers tend to have lower pre-tax-reform incomes than the winners.  
 In the calculation of welfare gains and losses at the household level we have 
employed the widely used concept of Equivalent Variation (EV). EV is a money measure of 
the welfare change and may be interpreted as a money measure of the household’s willingness 
to accept the current tax system instead of having an alternative tax system say, a flat tax on 
income. If EV is positive, then the household considers the alternative tax system to be better 
than the current one. Although the aggregate of EV across households is a commonly used 
money measure of welfare change in the total population, (see Rosen(1996) for a recent 
application), it is also a rather controversial one, and for two reasons. First, it requires a 
particular cardinalization of households’ utility functions that should also be comparable 
across households. Second, it implies an utilitarian social welfare function where all 
households are given equal welfare weigths. However, in case we do not permit the utility 
differences to be comparable across households, judgements based on an ordinal 
representation of preferences nevertheless allow for determining the losers and winners of the 
reform. In our case a majority in Italy and Sweden lose from having a flat tax on labor 
income, while in Norway a majority wins. Thus, if a flat tax rate reform were to be decided in 
a referendum, our results indicate that it would have received a yes in Norway and a no in 
Sweden in Italy. However, it should be emphasized that these results depend, inter alia, on 
the demographic and educational structure of the households used in the simulations.  
 Female labor supply responses are high in Norway and modest in Italy and Sweden. 
The weak labor supply responses for Italy are due to rigidity of working hours in the 
opportunity sets and to the fact that the 1992 tax system did not differ much from a 
proportional tax system, whilst the low responses in Sweden may be due to stricter 
regulations of working hours and high incomes.  
 The transition from progressive to proportional taxation reinforces the efficiency 
gains from a freer trade in Europe caused by the dismantling of borders. Then one may ask 
whether the reduction in loss of efficiency is attained at the cost of increased income and 
welfare inequality. Our results, however, do not indicate any sharp increase in income 
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inequality. On the contrary, in the case of Norway we find that the inequality in the 
distribution of gross household income is reduced to an extent that the distribution of the net 
household income is even made more equal. However, when the value of leisure is taken into 
account, we find that the welfare of rich households, measured by EV,  — in particular in 
Norway — increases far more than the welfare of poor households. 
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Appendix 1. Empirical specifications and estimation results 
The specifications of the utility functions and the opportunity density are nearly the same 
across the three countries; Italy, Norway and Sweden. 
Utility functions 
The utility function is a Box-Cox transformation of disposable income = household 
consumption and leisure, with the exception that for Italy utility is an exponential function of 
consumption with dummies reflecting labor market participation in front of this function. This 
specification allows for a lower marginal utility of consumption when one of the spouses are 
reported not working. The justification for this specification is that in Italy there is believed to 
be a considerable underreporting of income relative to the situation in Norway and Sweden. 
When one of the spouses is reported not to work he or she may in fact work and hence the 
actual income and household consumption may be higher than observed. Because the 
marginal utility of consumption is declining with consumption our specification should allow 
for a negative shift in the marginal utility of consumption when income of one of the spouses 
is reported to be zero. When we assumed the same structure for Italy as for Norway and 
Sweden, together with allowing for dummies in front of the consumption term, the estimation 
of the coefficients did not converge to permittable magnitudes. 
Opportunity densities 
The opportunity densities consist of three parts. The opportunity density for wages is log-
normal with the expectation depending on years of schooling and work experience. For Italy a 
regional dummy is introduced to capture the fact that the opportunities are quite different in 
the northern part of Italy relative to the southern part. The density of feasible job 
opportunities for Norwegian women depend on their education level, while in the case of Italy 
the regional distinction between Northern and Southern Italy together with local 
unemployment are considered to be important observable characteristics affecting job 
opportunities for males as well as for females. Unemployment was virtually non-existent in 
Norway and Sweden for the years covered by the data sets. Note that in the case of Sweden 
we estimate the model contingent upon the fact that both spouses work. In the 1980's the 
participation rate of Swedish women was so high ⎯ at the level of male participation ⎯ that 
to try to explain the non-participation of Swedish women by a utility maximizing behavior 
might have contaminated all estimates. Thus, in the Swedish case the model is estimated 
contingent upon observed wages and participation, and consequently there is no need to bring 
in opportunity densities for wages and jobs in this case. 
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 For all three countries offered hours are assumed to be uniformly distributed apart 
from a peak at full hours for males. For females we allow the opportunity density for hours to 
vary across the three countries. In the Italian case the rigidity in the labor market is believed 
to be either a normal "9 to 5" working day or not working at all, Di Tommaso (1998). 
Consequently, in the Italian case offered hours follow the same pattern across gender. In the 
Nordic welfare states more emphasize has been on offered married women a higher flexibility 
to combine work outside the household with family life. Thus, for Norway and Sweden we 
assume that for institutional reasons part-time work is typically offered. Sweden has a long 
tradition of regulating for labor market, so in the Swedish case we assume that there more 
institutionally set peaks in the distribution of offered hours than in Norway. Thus, for 
Swedish women offered hours are assumed to be uniformly distributed apart from peaks at 
full-time, 2/3 part-time and part-time, while in Norway we exclude the 2/3 part-time peak. 
Norway 
Let the subscript F and M denote female and male, respectively. In the case of married 
couples the structural part of the utility function defined by (6) is 
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where AF, AM are the age of the wife and the husband, respectively, CU6 and CO6 are number of 
children less than 6 and above 6 years, LK is leisure for gender k M , defined as F= ,
  (A.2) L hK K= −1 876/ 0,
and α j j, , ,...,=1 2 13 , are unknown parameters.  
 If α α α α1 3 7 21 1 1< < < >, , , 0,
>
0>
 
  ( )α α α4 5 6 2 0+ +log log ,A AM M
and 
  ( )α α α α α8 9 10 2 11 126 6+ + + +log logA A CU COF F
then  is increasing in C, decreasing in (  and strictly concave in 
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 It is assumed that the offered hours are not correlated with offered wage rates, which may 
be justified by the fact that in most countries working hours are regulated by law or set in central 
negotiations between unions and employers associations. The fraction of jobs with a given 
number of hours is assumed to be consistent with a uniform distribution of hours apart from a 
peak at full-time hours for males and part-time hours for females. The fraction of jobs with a 
given wage rate is assumed to be a log normal density with gender-specific means that depend on 
length of schooling and on experience. "Experience" is defined as age minus length of schooling 
minus six. The opportunity density of feasible jobs is assumed to have a constant mean in the case 
of males and to depend on education in the case of females, with the coefficient α14 measuring the 
impact of education on female job opportunities. 
 The results from estimating the model on Norwegian data from 1986 are given in 
Table 14. 
 Note that most parameters are rather precisely determined and have the theoretically 
expected signs. 
 The estimates are in accordance with the theory in the sense that the mean utility 
function is an increasing and strictly concave function in consumption and leisure. The males 
marginal mean utility of leisure in Norway attains a minimum at the age of 41.9 years and in 
the case of females, at the age of 35 years. The wife's education turns out to affect the fraction 
of feasible job opportunities such that a higher educated woman has more job opportunities 
than a less educated one. (Implied by .ˆ 014 <α ) 
 For the estimate of the wage opportunity density we refer to Aaberge et al. (1995). 
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Table 14. Estimates of the parameters of the utility function and of the opportunity density. 
Norway 1986 
Variables Coefficient Estimates t-values 
Preferences:  
  Consumption α1 0.951 16.4
 α2 1.269 5.6
  
  Male leisure α3 -4.312 6.8
 α4 100.598 3.0
 α5 -53.091 3.0
 α6 7.270 3.0
  
  Female leisure α7 -2.240 5.5
 α8 237.438 3.9
 α9 -130.174 3.9
 α10 18.492 4.1
 α11 3.397 6.4
 α12 1.648 4.8
  
Opportunities:  
  Female opportunity measure α13 0.063 0.1
 α14 -0.203 3.7
  
  Male opportunity measure α15 -3.296 4.5
  
  Interaction α16 1.289 4.5
    Full-time peak, males α17 1.062 11.2
    Full-time peak, females α18 0.710 5.8
    Part-time peak, females α19 0.425 2.5
 
Sweden 
The structural part of the utility function is defined by 
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 The fraction of jobs with a given number of hours is assumed to be consistent with a 
uniform distribution of hours apart from a peak at full-time hours for males and peaks at full-
time, 2/3 part-time and part-time hours for females. 
 We do not model the participation decision and thus, observations are only for 
married couples who are working. In 1981 the labor force rates both for males and females 
were very high in Sweden (highest in the world). 
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 In Table 15 we present the estimates based on household data from 1981. 
 
Table 15. Estimates of the parameters of the utility function and of the opportunity 
density, Sweden 1981 
Variables Coefficient Estimates t-values 
Preferences:    
  Consumption α1 0.574  9.4
 α2 9.278  11.4
    
  Male leisure α3 -4.607  5.8
 α4 174.644  3.0
 α5 -91.188  3.0
 α6 12.371  3.1
    
  Female leisure α7 -4.106  6.5
 α8 153.041  2.5
 α9 -78.834  2.4
 α10 10.876  2.5
 α11 1.541  3.8
 α12 0.805  3.1
    
Opportunities:    
  Full-time peak, males α13 3.424  47.1
  Full-time peak, females α14 2.814  29.1
  2/3 part-time peak, females α15 1.454  13.5
  Part-time peak, females α16 1.830  18.8
 
 
 Note that most parameters are rather precisely determined and they have the 
theoretically expected signs. 
 The estimates imply that the mean utility function is an increasing and strictly concave 
function in consumption and leisure. The males marginal mean utility of leisure attains a 
minimum at the age of 41.9 years and in the case of females, at the age of 35 years, exactly the 
same as for Norway. 
 The estimated wage opportunity density and aggregate labor supply elasticities are 
reported in Aaberge et al. (1990). 
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Italy 
The functional form of the deterministic part of the utility function is defined by 
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K j =1  if spouse j is working; otherwise  and the specification implies that the marginal 
utility of consumption differs with respect to the reported labor market participation. 
K j = 0,
 Since the regional variation of wages is more important than in the Scandinavian 
countries, and since unemployment in Italy has been rather high by Norwegian/Swedish 
standards, we have included regional dummies and local unemployment rates as explanatory 
variables. The opportunity measure for wages are specified as follows,  
  (A.5) ( )log ( ) Re ( )W z s Exp Exp g zj j j j j j j j j j j= + + + + +β β β β β η0 1 2 3 2 4
j F M= , , where  are normally distributed,  denotes years of schooling, gender 
j, Expj = experience =  and  living in Northern Regions (North of Tuscany) 
and 0 otherwise. Moreover, 
( )η ηF Mz z( ), ( )
A sj j− − 6
s j
Re g =1
  (A.6) ( )log Re ,g gF01 15 16 17= + +α α α UEF
UEM
and 
  (A.7) ( )log Reg gM10 18 19 20= + +α α α
where UEj is the ratio between the number of unemployed and employed for gender j. 
 It should be noted that the specifications (A.6) and (A.7) imply the following 
interpretation of the model parameters. If α16 and α19 are positive, then living in Northern Italy 
improves the chances of finding a market opportunity, compared to living in Central and Southern 
Italy. Likewise, negative values of α17 and α20 indicate that unemployment has a negative impact 
on job opportunities. 
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 Feasible hours in the market is assumed to be uniformly distributed except for peaks at 
full-time hours for females and males, which are defined by the interval [1846, 2106]. Note that 
this interval corresponds to weekly hours between 36 and 40. 
 The estimation results are reported in Table 16. 
 
Table 16. Estimates of the parameters of the utility function and of the opportunity 
density, Italy 1987. 
Variables Coefficient Estimates t-values 
Consumption α1 -0.780 ⋅ 10-4 -7.7
 α2 -15.938  -8.3
 α3 -10.020  -19.1
 α4 -15.364  -11.4
    
Male leisure α5 -18.651  -16.4
 α6 -0.180  -1.4
 α7 0.102  1.5
 α8 -0.015  -1.4
    
Female leisure α9 -6.805  -8.1
 α10 34.428  2.2
 α11 -19.039  -2.2
 α12 2.716  2.3
 α13 0.225  1.8
 α14 0.275  2.7
    
Female opportunity density α15 -0.952  -2.8
 α16  0.705  6.5
 α17 -0.594  -0.9
    
Male opportunity density α18 -0.512  -8.4
 α19 0.310  1.2
 α20 0.243  0.1
    
Full-time peak, males α21 2.406  28.0
 
 
  
Full-time peak, females α22 2.501  51.9
 
 
 The estimates imply that the deterministic part of the utility function is an increasing and 
strictly concave function of leisure and consumption. The basic parameters of the utility function 
are α1, α5 and α9. These parameters are measured with good precision. Because 41 αα −  all are 
estimated to be negative, these empirical results imply ⎯ as expected ⎯ that the marginal utility 
of consumption, given the consumption level, is lower when one of the spouses are reported not 
to work. The marginal utility of consumption and leisure depends also on personal characteristics 
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such as age and number of children. The estimates for the coefficients of these variables are less 
precise. Children have the expected positive effect on the value of wife's leisure. However, a 
rather surprising result is that the presence of older children have essentially the same effect as 
younger ones; as a matter of fact the point estimate for the former ones is even larger (this result, 
however, accords with other analyses of Italian data, see e.g. Colombino and Del Boca (1990)). A 
possible explanation might be found in a cohort effect. Women with older children on average 
belong to older cohorts. For a variety of unobserved factors (attitudes, supply of child-care 
services, etc.) which change from one cohort to the other, older cohorts presumably tend to use a 
more "leisure-intensive" technology in child-care. 
 The estimated parameters of the job-opportunities density confirm − at least for females − 
a more favourable environment in Northern regions. On the other hand, the effect of 
unemployment is not measured precisely enough to draw any clear conclusion. For a more 
comprehensive discussion of the empirical results we refer to Aaberge et al. (1993) who also 
report the estimated wage opportunity density and various aggregate labor supply elasticities. 
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